We use data from the US airline industry to estimate a model of entry deterrence. We model the interaction among airlines as a repeated static game, where we allow for a very general form of heterogeneity. We consider a menu of three alternative games that describe the strategic interaction among airlines: simultaneous and sequential move games, and a sequential move game with deterrence investments. Following Bernheim [1984], deterrence investments include all investment that raises barriers to entry, and for which the incumbent must incur some investment costs. We show that the pro…ts that incumbents can make in the sequential game, both with and without deterrence investments, are larger than those that they can make if the game is played simultaneously. Thus, we …nd that on average it is pro…table for all …rms to deter new entrants, with the exception of United Airlines. Remarkably, United Airlines was under bankruptcy protection during the period of analysis, suggesting that its deterrence investments were not credible. Overall, we …nd that the data is explained better by a model where …rms make deterrence investments. Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that incumbents deter entrants in the airline industry.
Introduction
In 1999 the Transportation Research Board (TRB [1999] ) prepared a list of informal complaints of anticompetitive behavior submitted by airlines to the Department of Transportation. The list of complaints was striking for several important reasons.
First, all of the complaints were made by low cost carriers against legacy carriers.
Second, the complaints concerned competition in markets connecting the hub of the legacy airline and medium-sized cities, such as Mobile, Des Moines, or Jacksonville.
Finally, and most importantly for this paper, all complaints centered on the claim that legacy carriers had used exclusionary tactics to maintain their monopoly in the markets cited in the complaint. In essence, this list of complaints provides stylized and anecdotal evidence that legacy carriers act to deter the entrance or force the exit of low cost carriers in order to maintain a monopoly in certain markets. In this paper, we propose a practical and transparent methodology to determine whether …rms make investments to raise barriers to deter new entrants. Determining whether …rms successfully deter new entrants is an important topic of research because, where entry is not arti…cially impeded, competition ensures that prices are in the long run re ‡ective of the full cost of e¢ciently providing airline services.
We start from the observation that in any theory of entry deterrence, the incumbent can prevent the entry of competitors but only at a cost or investment that the incumbent could avoid if entry were instead accommodated. We call these costs the "deterrence investments" (Bernheim [1984] ). Then, we exploit the theory developed in Bernheim [1984] , where the de…nition of deterrence investment is intentionally ambiguous so as to abstract from the complex issues that arise with particular theories of entry deterrence and to focus on the fundamental trade-o¤ that the incumbent faces. Firms can make deterrence investments to block the entry of pro…t-lowering competitors, and deterrence investments include all investment that raise barriers to entry, but these investments are costly. Our objective is to estimate the costs of deterrence investments and compare them with the pro…ts made by the …rm when they do not deter their competitors; we then predict whether or not …rms make these investments when they face the threat of new entry.
We model the interaction among airlines as a repeated static entry game, where we allow for very general forms of heterogeneity, which lead to multiple equilibria. In the same spirit as Kadiyali [1996] , we estimate a menu of di¤erent games to choose the one that …ts the data best. The …rst game is a repeated static simultaneous move entry game with complete information. This is akin to the game studied by Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] , except that airlines interact repeatedly over time. The second game is a repeated static game, where …rms can face two scenarios, depending on the exogenous history of the game. If one of the …rms was the only incumbent in the prior period, then the …rms play a sequential move game where the incumbent moves …rst. Otherwise, the …rms play a one-shot simultaneous move game as in Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] and move to the next period. Finally, we consider a game where the …rms can make deterrence investments in a sequential move game. Thus, the model that allows only for simultaneous move games is nested into the one that allows for sequential move games depending on the game history, which is nested into the one that allows for …rms playing a sequential move game to also make deterrence investments.
To identify deterrence investments, we use changes in …rms' entry decisions over time. The idea is to compare entry decisions across similar markets whose market structures change di¤erently over time. In particular, if there are two markets that have identical observable and unobservable characteristics, and in one there is only one incumbent over time, while in the other there are periods with two …rms, then it must be the case that the incumbent in the …rst market does deter new entrants.
Using this simple idea, we estimate the costs that incumbents must face to make "deterrence investments" and determine if there are some airlines that systematically prevent new entry.
Data are from the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), which is a 10 percent sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers. These are quarterly data from 2004, and they are organized by market, year, and quarter. The panel data provide the variation needed to identify both the competitive e¤ect of the …rms' entry ( ) and the cost of the deterrence investments (c). First, we observe entry in markets where there are no incumbents (or there is more than one incumbent), and there we will assume that …rms play a simultaneous move game. We also observe entry in markets where there is only one incumbent, and there we will assume that …rms play a sequentialmove game. Therefore, we identify c separately from . Second, the set of competitors vary by market, so it is possible to allow …rms to have heterogeneous competitive e¤ects and deterrence costs.
The estimation is largely based on Tamer [2003] and Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] , who propose a methodology to estimate a game among airlines in a one-shot static simultaneous-move game. The fundamental idea behind their methodology, which we will brie ‡y review in the paper, is that even in the presence of multiple equilibria, one can estimate sets of parameters of the pro…t functions that correspond to models with di¤erent equilibrium selection rules. Tamer [2003] and Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] show that one can construct upper and lower bounds for the probabilities that the various equilibrium outcomes can take and then choose the parameters that minimize an appropriately de…ned distance between these lower and upper bounds and the empirical probabilities. Methodologically, the di¤erence here is that when …rms can play a sequential move or deterrence game, there will be almost always a unique equilibrium. However, because in some markets …rms play a simultaneous move game, we still will only be able to estimate sets of parameter values, and so we will not be able to achieve point identi…cation.
We …nd that the model where …rms make deterrence investments …ts the data much better than a model where …rms play a simultaneous or sequential move game.
Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that incumbents deter entrants in the airline industry. In addition, we show that the pro…ts incumbents can make if they move …rst are larger than those that they can make if the game is played simultaneously. This result is stronger, as one would expect, when incumbents can deter new entrants. Finally, we …nd that all …rms deter new entrants, with the exception of United Airlines.
Remarkably, United Airlines was under bankruptcy protection during the period of analysis, suggesting that its deterrence investments were not credible. This last result underscores the importance of modeling …rms as heterogenous competitors.
Our paper contributes to two important literatures. First we contribute to the literature on the estimation of entry games with complete information (Bresnahan and Reiss [1990] , Berry [1992] , Mazzeo [2002] , and Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] ) by allowing …rms to play a simultanous or sequential-move game and to deter new entrants. Bresnahan and Reiss [1990] and Berry [1992] considered a sequential and a simultaneous-move game as alternatives to describe the interaction between car dealers and airlines. However, Bresnahan and Reiss [1990] and Berry [1992] maintained that …rms were playing the same game, whether simultaneous or sequential-move, in all markets. Here, the selection of the type of game played is a function of the past history of the game, and thus …rms play sequential and simultaneous move game across di¤erent markets and time.
Second, we contribute to the literature on deterrence. Our paper is closest to Kadiyali [1996] , which examines deterrence and entry in the photographic …lm industry. Kadiyali [1996] estimates the post-entry demand and cost functions of two …rms by estimating a menu of di¤erent games and choosing the game that …ts the data best. With these demand and cost estimates, she concludes that the incumbent was forced to accommodate the entrant because the pro…t the incumbent would have made under a deterrence strategy was lower than the pro…t it made under accommodation. Kadiyali's strategy relies on identifying one particular postentry game that is being played in all markets. In our paper, we allow for …rms to play multiple types of games across markets and time. We also allow for …rm heterogeneity, which leads to multiple equilibria in the number and identity of …rms; this allows for a more general framework for examining deterrence. Other papers in the deterrence literature include Ellison and Ellison [2011] and Goolsbee and Syverson [2008] . Ellison and Ellison [2011] test a theoretical prediction of the relationship between investment and market size -a relationship that di¤ers depending on whether or not …rms deter potential entrants. Goolsbee and Syversion [2008] identify deterrence by looking at changes in incumbent behavior that result from exogenous changes in potential entry behavior. Di¤erently from these two papers, our paper explicitly allows for multiple equilibria and for …rms to decide between deterrence and accommodation. There are also dynamic structural models of deterrence, including Sweeting [2013 ], Williams [2011 ], Chicu [2012 , and Snider [2009] . These dynamic models allow forward-looking behavior by …rms; however, none of these papers allow for multiple equilibria.
The theoretical literature on deterrence is vast. Both Spence [1977] and Dixit [1980] provide theoretical arguments for deterrence. Spence [1977] shows that entry can be deterred by the mere existence of capacity; Dixit [1980] extends the argument and shows that since investment in capacity can alter the outcomes in the postentry game, there can be incentives to invest in capacity in order to deter potential entrants. There are many variations on this basic theoretical model. Fudenberg and Tirole [1984] add advertising and show that an incumbent's low advertising preentry is a credible threat of deterrence, because it allows the incumbent …rm to cut prices if a competitor were to enter. Judd [1985] allows for multiproduct incumbent …rms, and he allows these …rms to exit after entrants enter the market; he shows that intensive post-entry competition may facilitate entry, because the multiproduct incumbent …rms are more likely to exit the market. Bulow et al. [1985] show that the incentives for a …rm to engage in deterrence di¤er depending on whether potential competitors' goods are substitutes or complements. In particular, when goods are strategic complements, …rms may underinvest in capital in order to reduce future competition. Bernheim [1984] extends the basic model to allow …rms to enter over multiple periods. In this case, he shows the counterintuitive result that policies that are intended to increase competition, such as subsidizing entry, can have the opposite e¤ect. Finally, Anderson and Engers (1994) do not focus on deterrence, but they develop a theoretical model that solves the problem in the standard Stackelberg model that the order of moves is exogenously speci…ed. In their model …rms compete over entry time. In our analysis, the order of moves is exogenous, but it changes across markets and time.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes anecdotal evidence of deterrence in the airline industry. Section 3 describes the model and econometric methodology. Section 4 provides information on the data, and Section 5 details the iden…t-ication strategy. Section 6 presents the estimation results, and Section 7 compares counterfactual pro…ts under each type of game. Section 8 concludes. 3 The Entry Game Played by the Airlines: Estimation
We assume here that the game played by the airlines is played repeatedly over time.
In each period, airlines know each other strategies and payo¤s; thus, this is a complete information game. A strategy pro…le in this game tells each …rm under what conditions to enter into a market, and it will depend on the nature of the game that the …rms play (i.e. whether the game is simultaneous-or sequential-move).
Formally, there are I airlines, indexed by i = 1; :::; I, that must decide whether to enter into the market m = 1; :::; M at time t = 1; :::; 1. Let y imt = 1 if …rm i enters in market m at time t and y imt = 0 otherwise. The entry decisions y mt are observed but the pro…ts made by the …rms, mt , are unobservable.
The data consist of a random sample of market-…rm-time speci…c observations (y mt ; X mt ). Let mt = ( 1mt ; : : : ; Im t ) be a mean zero random variable, independent, both across time and across markets, of X mt , and it has a known (up to a …nite dimensional parameter ) distribution F . mt = ( imt ; :::; Im t ) is known to the players but unobserved to the econometrician, which is why we have a game of complete information.
The unobservable error imt is modeled as follows:.
m represents market unobservables that are market speci…c and constant over time; it captures, for example, the fact that in market m there is a large share of business passengers. mt is a market shock that changes over time, and which a¤ects …rms in market m in the same way; for example, changes in the demand for travel over time. im is a time-invariant market-speci…c airline shock to allow di¤erent …rms to face di¤erent unobservables in the same market; for example, some airlines might see a larger share of business passengers in the same market than other airlines do.
Finally, imt are time-variant, …rm-speci…c shocks.
X mt is a k I matrix of k exogenous determinants of entry decisions, both marketand carrier-speci…c. It includes both a vector of market characteristics that are common among the …rms in market m and a vector of …rm characteristics that enter into the pro…ts of all the …rms in that market.
Simultaneous Move Game
The instantaneous pro…t function is written as follows:
The observed part of the pro…t is known up to a …nite dimensional parameter
An important feature of the pro…t function in this paper is the presence of j , which summarizes the e¤ect that airline j has on i's pro…ts. In particular, notice that this function depends directly on the identity of the …rms (y j 's, j 6 = i). If we assume that …rms play a simultaneous-move game in all markets and in all periods, then this is simply the model in Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] applied to panel data rather than to cross section data. We refer to that paper for the detailed description of the estimation methodology. Here we provide a brief summary.
The statistical model associated with the simultaneous move game is as follows:
:::
with j = 1; :::; I: Thus, this is simultanous system of discrete choice equations.
The problem with the estimation of such model is that in general it has multiple equilibria. Tamer [2003] proposed a methodology to identify sets of parameters of the model for the case of two …rms choosing between two decisions (e.g. whether or not to enter into a market) and Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] provided a practical methodology to estimate sets in the case of many …rms making multiple decisions.
In particular, Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] show that Model (1) provides the following inequality restrictions on regressions:
where Pr(yjx) is a 2 I vector of choice probabilities that we consistently estimate using the data, and we interpret the inequalities element by element. The H's are functions of and the distribution function F , where is part of the vector . As Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] explain, the identi…ed set, I , is then the set of parameter values that obeys the inequality restrictions for all x almost everywhere and represents the set of economic models that is consistent with the empirical evidence. For a given parameter value, the estimator is based on minimizing the distance between this vector of choice probabilities and the set of predicted probabilities.
We estimate Model (1) using a sharp two-step minimum distance estimator. First, we estimate the conditional choice probabilities non-parametrically, using a simple frequency estimator. Then, we estimate the identi…ed set I using the simulation procedure provided in Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] . In practice we simulate random draws of m , mt , im , and imt from four independent normal distributions with mean zero and variance equal to 1.
Sequential Move Game
We now consider the case when …rms might play di¤erent games depending on the exogenous history of their previous interactions. More speci…cally, we will maintain that at each time t and in each market m, airlines can play one of two types of games:
a simultaneous-move game or a sequential-move game. The game that …rms play at time t + 1 is determined by the observed market structure at time t. If in the data we observe that at time t in market m …rm 2 was the only incumbent, then at time t + 1 the two …rms play a sequential move game, where …rm 2 is the leader and …rm 1 is the follower. (If there were no incumbents or multiple incumbents in the previous period, then the …rms play a simultaneous-move game). In a sequentialmove game, one …rm makes her entry decision before the other …rms choose theirs, and all other …rms can observe the …rst mover's choice. Thus, in a sequential-move game the followers' actions are conditional on the …rst mover's actions. If the …rms play a sequential-move game, then they use the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium solution concept to solve the game they play. A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is a combination of …rm's strategies y mt such that no …rm can unilaterally bene…t from choosing a di¤erent strategy at any stage of the game.
To illustrate the type of game that …rms play at each period, consider Table 2 , which presents several possible scenarios with two airlines (American and Delta) in one particular market. In the …rst quarter of 1998 neither of the two airlines was serving this particular market. Therefore, in the second quarter of 1998, there was no incumbent, and thus the two airlines played a simultaneous-move game. Among the possible realizations, the airlines ended up in the one where American entered into the market, while Delta did not enter. In the third quarter of 1998, American is now the incumbent and moves …rst, and Delta follows. The interpretation of the game in the other quarters is analogous. Consider now the game played in the third quarter of 1998 by the two …rms.
American was the incumbent in the second quarter, and thus American must decide whether or not to enter before Delta makes its decision. To determine the one-shot equilibrium of the game, the game is solved through backward induction. First, we determine the Nash pure strategy equilibria in the second stage of the game, the one where only Delta must decide whether to enter, given the decision made by
American. Then, we determine whether in the second stage equilibrium "chosen" by where American moves …rst, there will be a unique equilibrium, (y AA ; y DL ) = (1; 0).
The sequential and simultaneous move games have the same payo¤s but they possibly have di¤erent equilibria. The set of equilibria of the sequential move game is a subset of the one in the simultaneous move game. This observation leads to the discussion concerning the estimation.
If the …rms play a sequential move game in a market at some point in time, and there is a unique equilibrium, then the inequalities (2) hold with equality. The way we derive the equalities and inequalities is conceptually analogous to the way that Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] derive the inequalities for the simultaneous move game.
First, we estimate non-parametrically the empirical probability of each market structure as in the …rst step for the estimation of the parameters in the simultaneous move game, except that now we need to include the information on whether or not there is an incumbent, and its identity.
Then, we determine the game that the …rms play, whether simultaneous-or sequential move. In particular, we determine for each market m in each period t the equilibria of the simultaneous-move game. Then, we determine whether there is at least one equilibrium where the incumbent (e.g. American) is in the market among these simultaneous-move equilibria. As in the example above, if there is such an equilibrium, then the incumbent will move …rst and will able to select this equilibrium.
Clearly this process is only applied if there is an incumbent in the market; otherwise, we solve the game as if it were a simultaneous move game.
A Game of Strategic Deterrence
Generally, the fact that one airline, say American, has the …rst mover advantage does not imply that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium where American is in the market. This only occurs if there is one subgame perfect equilibrium where
American is in the market. This is where the role of strategic deterrence comes into play. Following Bernheim [1984] , we will assume that an incumbent can opt to deter new entrants when the game is sequential. An incumbent …rm i can make deterrence investments by paying a deterrence cost c i at time t and ensure that it will be a monopolist at time t + 1.
To understand the role of the deterrence investments, consider again the example of the strategic interaction between American and Delta illustrated in In the sequential-move game where …rms can make deterrence investments we proceed as follows. As in the sequential-move game, we …rst estimate the empirical probability of each market structure conditional on whether one of the …rms was a single incumbent in the previous period. So the …rst stage nonparametric estimates are the same in the case when we allow …rms to play a sequential move game and when we allow them to make deterrence investments.
Then, we solve the game as if the …rms were playing a sequential-move game; that is, as if they did not have the possibility to make deterrence investments. We then compute the pro…ts of the incumbent in each of the subgame perfect equilibria of the sequential game. Among all these pro…ts we choose the one where the incumbent makes the lowest pro…t. Next, we compute the "deterrence pro…t", given by the pro…t that the incumbent would make as a monopolist, and we subtract the deterrence cost c. We compare the "deterrence pro…t" of the incumbent to the lowest pro…t that the incumbent would make in the equilibria of the sequential game. If the "deterrence pro…t" is lower, then the incumbent plays a sequential game; if the pro…ts minus the deterrence costs are non-negative, the incumbent incurs the deterrence cost and deter new entrants; otherwise the …rms play a simultaneous-move game. 
Data and Variables

Data
The main data are from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) from the year 2004; this data include details on each domestic itinerary, including operating carrier, origin carrier, origin and destination airports, number of passengers, distance, and the fare. We merge this dataset by operating carrier with the T-100 Domestic Segment Dataset, which contains domestic market data by air carriers, origin and destination airports for passengers enplaned. Unlike the DB1B dataset, the T-100 is not a sample; it reports all domestic ‡ights in a given month of the year. From the merged dataset we drop tickets with ‡ights that have a frequency that is less than weekly, and we also drop tickets with ‡ights for which there is no record in the T-100
Segment. We then clean the dataset as described in Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] . 2 The unit of observation in the cleaned dataset is by market-carrier-year-quarter. Since we are only interested in knowing whether or not a carrier served a market, we construct an indicator variable that equals 1 if the carrier serves the market and 0 otherwise.
Therefore, the unit of observation is by market-year-quarter in the …nal dataset. Time is denoted by t, and a unit of observation is individually denoted by the triple jmt.
We de…ne a market as a trip between two airports, regardless of intermediate transfer points and direction of ‡ight. Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] use the same dataset but on a di¤erent set of markets and as a cross-section.
2 In particular, we drop: 1) Tickets with more than 6 coupons; 2) Tickets involving USnonreporting carrier ‡ying within North America (small airlines serving big airlines) and foreign carrier ‡ying between two US points; 3) Tickets that are part of international travel; 4) Tickets involving non-contiguous domestic travel (Hawaii, Alaska, and Territories); 5) Tickets whose fare credibility is questioned by the DOT; 6) Tickets that are neither one-way nor round-trip travel; 7) Tickets including travel on more than one airline on a directional trip (known as interline tickets); 8) Tickets with fares less than 20 dollars; 9) Tickets in the top and bottom …ve percentiles of the year-quarter fare distribution. We de…ne a …rm as serving a market if it transported at least 20 passengers in one quarter. unfair exclusionary practices, provides insights on the nature of competition between low cost carriers and national carriers, and we use these insights to determine the relevant markets. We merge our data with demographic information from the U.S.
Census Bureau for all Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) of the United States.
We then rank airports by the MSA's market size. To maintain exogeneity of selection of markets to the observed patterns of entry, we include all markets out of the top 150 MSAs as ranked by their population. 3 We then drop all markets where the two endpoints are both in the top 30 MSAs. 4 We also include markets that are temporarily not served by any carrier, where the number of observed entrants is equal to zero. To distinguish markets that are almost never served by any carrier from markets that are only temporarily not served by any carrier, we proceed as in Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] . Using the full 1996-2007 dataset of market-carrier-year-quarter observations, we compute the number of quarters that a market has been served by at least one carrier, for each market, m. 5 Then, we drop all markets that were not served in at least 50 percent of the quarters in the full dataset.
We consider all the national carriers (American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, USAir, Southwest). Small, low-cost carriers are present in only a few markets. 6 Rather than dropping these carriers from the market analysis because we cannot identify their impact on the entry decisions of competitors, we group them in a meaningful way in order to capture the impact of their presence. To this end, we construct an indicator variable, Low Cost Carrier Small, LCC, which is equal to 1 if one or more low cost carriers are present in the market, and 0 otherwise. Carriers are denoted by i. We exclude all markets in which one of the carriers has a hub at either endpoint.
As in Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] , the entry decision in each market for each airline is interpreted as a "marginal" decision, and the airline's network structure is taken as given. This marginal approach to the study of airline markets is also used in the literature that studies the relationship between market concentration and pricing. For example, Borenstein [1989] does not include prices in other markets out of Atlanta (e.g. ATL-ORD) to explain fares in the market ATL-AUS.
Variables
Using Berry's [1992] insight, we use the carrier's Airport Presence at the market's endpoints to construct measures of carrier heterogeneity. To compute airport presence at one airport, we compute a carrier's ratio of markets served by the carrier out of an airport over the total number of markets served out of an airport by at least one carrier. We then average the carrier's airport presence at the two endpoints to de…ne the carrier's Airport Presence.
7
A …rm-and market-speci…c measure of cost is not available. To proxy for the cost that a carrier incurs in order to serve a particular market, we construct a measure of the opportunity …xed cost of serving a market. To do this, we …rst compute the sum of the geographical distances between a market's endpoints and the carrier's closest 7 In the case of the Medium Airlines (MA), we …rst compute the airport presence for USAir, Continental, and America West, and then we take the maximum of the three. In the case of the Low Cost Carriers (LCC), we …rst compute the airport presence of each of the low cost carriers, and then again we take their maximum.
hub.
8 Then, we compute the di¤erence between this distance and the nonstop distance between the two airports, and we divide this di¤erence by the nonstop distance. This ratio can be interpreted as the percentage of the nonstop distance that must be traveled if the airline were to use a connecting ‡ight instead of a nonstop ‡ight to serve the market. This is a good measure of the opportunity …xed cost of serving a market, because it measures the cost of the best alternative to non-stop service, which is a connecting ‡ight through the closest hub. This measure is associated with the …xed cost of providing airline service because it is a function of the total capacity of a plane but does not depend on the number of passengers transported in a particular ‡ight. We denote this variable as Cost.
We include six control variables. Three are demographic variables. 9 We calculate Market Size as the geometric mean of the city populations at the market endpoints in order to measure the size of the potential market. We use average per capita incomes (Per Capita Income) and the average rates of income growth (Income Growth Rate)
of the cities at the market endpoints to measure the strength of the economies at the endpoints. The other three control variables are geographical variables. Market
Distance is the non-stop distance between the endpoints. The distance from each airport to the closest alternative airport (Close Airport) controls for the strength of 8 Data on the distances between airports, which are also used to construct the variable Close Airport are from the dataset Aviation Support Tables : Master Coordinate, available from the National Transportation Library. To construct the measure of Cost we consider the following hub airports: Dallas Fort Worth and Chicago O'Hare for American; Cleveland, Houston International, and Newark for Continental; Atlanta, Cincinnati and Dallas Fort Worth for Delta; Phoenix and Las Vegas for America West; Minneapolis and Detroit for Northwest; Denver and Chicago O'Hare for United; Charlotte, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia for USAir. To derive the measure of Cost for the Medium Airlines (MA) we take the minimum among the distances that we compute for Continental, USAir, America West, and Northwest. Southwest does not really have major hubs; it uses several airports, among which we consider Chicago Midway, Baltimore, Las Vegas, Houston Hobby, Phoenix, Orlando. With the exception of ATA, Low Cost Carriers do not have hubs in the same sense that we mean for the largest carriers. To construct a measure of the cost, we computed the (minimum) distance from airports where LCCs had a meaningful presence.
9 Data are from the Regional Economic Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, download in February, 2005. passengers' alternative option, which is to ‡y from a di¤erent airport to the same destination.
10 Finally, we also include the sum of the distances from the market endpoints to the geographical center of the United States (US Center Distance).
This variable controls for the fact that, just for purely geographical reasons, cities in the middle of the United States have a larger set of close cities than cities on the coasts or cities at the borders with Mexico and Canada.
11 10 For example, Chicago Midway is the closest alternative airport to Chicago O'Hare. Notice that for each market we have two of these distances, since we have two endpoints. Our variable is equal to the minimum of these two distances. In previous versions of the paper we addressed the concern that many large cities have more than one airport. For example, it is possible to ‡y from San Francisco to Washington on nine di¤erent routes. In a previous version of the paper,we allowed the …rms' unobservables to be spatially correlated across markets between the same two cities. In the estimation, whenever a market was included in the subsample that we drew to construct the parameter bounds, we also included any other market between the same two cities. This is similar to adjusting the moment conditions to allow for spatial correlation. In our context, it was easy to adjust for it since we knew which of the observations were correlated, i.e., ones that had airports in close proximity. 11 The location of the mean center of population is from the Geography Division at the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Based on the 1990 census results, that was located in Crawford County, Missouri. In order to run the estimation and compute the con…dence intervals using Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer [2007] , we discretize the continuous variables. Variables could be discretized in quartiles or deciles; here, we discretize the variables using extremely …ne discretizations so that the discrete variables have the same means and standard deviations as the continuous variables.
Identi…cation
Identi…cation of Strategic Deterrence
There are at least three reasons why one …rm might be a monopolist for a long period of time in a market that are completely unrelated to strategic deterrence.
First, a …rm might have a particularly high market-carrier shock, allowing it to operate as a monopolist over a long period of time. To address this possibility, we use the basic idea that one bad shock to a …rm cannot explain why a …rm never enters in a market where American is the incumbent. If the other …rm is pro…table on average, then that …rm should enter unless American deters its entry. To identify deterrence from a high market-carrier shock, we include im .
Second, there might only be space for one …rm in the market, in the sense that two …rms would not be able to both make nonnegative pro…ts. However, if this is the case, then we should see no pattern in the identity of the monopolist over time.
Third, there might be multiple equilibria with di¤erent number of …rms in a market, and we might simply observe the equilibrium with one …rm rather than one with two or more …rms. The …rst two columns of Table 4 illustrate how we plan to identify strategic deterrence from these other two possibilities.
There are two …rms that compete against each other in one market, and for simplicity of exposition, we again consider American and Delta as the two competing …rms. At time 0 neither …rm is present in the market, because neither …rm makes nonnegative pro…ts. Then at time 1 there is a positive shock to the pro…ts of both …rms and either one but not both of the …rms can enter into the market. American enters. At time 2 there is another positive shock to the pro…ts of both …rms, and now both American and Delta can pro…tably enter into the market. However, we observe only American in the market. At time 3 there is a negative shock to the pro…ts of both …rms and American must exit the market. At time 4 there is a positive shock to both pro…ts and either one but not both of the …rms can enter into the market. This time Delta enters. At time 5 there is another positive shock to both pro…ts and both American and Delta enter into the market.
The …rst two columns of Table 4 summarize this example. American was able to prevent the entry of Delta when American was the incumbent, while Delta was not able to prevent the entry of American when Delta was the incumbent. Table 4 shows how the identi…cation strategy discussed in the …rst two columns of Table 4 can be used to identify the cost that airlines must incur to deter new entrants. Since
American deterred Delta from entry at time t = 2, then it must be that The critical feature of this stylized model is that the incumbent faces a trade-o¤.
The incumbent can deter new entrants, but only at a cost c i . Whether the incumbent will actually deter new entrants depends on the characteristics (and unobservables)
of the market and of the new entrant.
The critical variation that is needed for the econometric analysis concerns new entry and exit. In order to identify the role of strategic deterrence, it is crucial to see …rms entering in markets that were not previously served by any airline and …rms entering in markets that are already served by other airlines. This variation in the market structure within markets over time separately identi…es the e¤ect of strategic deterrence from the role that sunk costs, operating costs, and demand changes have on market structure. Table 5 illustrates this type of variation in the data. Finally, there that there is less entry by the national airlines where a Low Cost Carrier is the only incumbent in the market.
Exclusion Restrictions
We assume that the unobservables are not correlated with our exogenous variables.
We consider a reduced form pro…t function, where all of the control variables (e.g. population, distance) are maintained to be exogenous.
The main di¢culty of estimating Model (1) is given by the presence of the competitors' entry decisions, since it is a simultaneous move entry game. Theorem 2 in Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] shows that we can identify the parameters with an exclusion restriction consisting of a variable that enters …rm i's pro…t but not …rm j's. If this variable has wide support (i.e. a large degree of variation), then this reduces the size of the identi…ed set. We have two variables that work as exclusion restrictions:
Airport Presence and Cost.
Results
We present the results for the empirical speci…cations in the same order as the statistical models in Section 3. We present the results for the (repeated static) simultaneous, sequential, and deterrence games. Then we compare the results across the various speci…cations.
In our results, we report superset con…dence regions that cover the truth, I , with a prespeci…ed probability. This parameter might be partially identi…ed. Since, in general, these models are not point identi…ed, and since the true parameter, along with all parameters in the identi…ed set minimize a nonlinear objective function, it is not possible to provide estimates of the bounds on the true parameter. Instead, we report con…dence regions that cover the true parameter value and that can be used as consistent estimators for the bounds of the partially identi…ed parameter I . In each table we report the cube that contains the con…dence region that is de…ned as the set that contains the parameters that cannot be rejected as the truth with at least 95% probability.
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Column 1 of Table 6 presents the results of the estimation of a static simultaneous move game. Here, the e¤ect of American's entry is di¤erent from the e¤ect of Delta's entry on other airlines. However, American's entry a¤ects all its competitors in the same way. For example, AA 6 = DL . The e¤ect of American on all of its competitors is included in [ 11:589; 9:597], while the e¤ect of Continental is included in 13:816; 11:926] . This implies that the entry of a second competitor is less likely if Continental enters the market than if American does. The negative e¤ect of the entry of an LCC on the probability of entry of another competitor is even stronger, 13 Not every parameter in the cube belongs to the con…dence region. This region can contain holes but here we report the smallest "cube" that contains the con…dence region.
as it is included in [ 18:954; 16:335] . Overall, LCCS have the strongest negative e¤ect on competitors, as was also found in Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] . American has the weakest e¤ect, while the other airlines are comparable ([ 12:436; 10:834] for Delta, [ 12:681; 11:103] for the MA type, [ 12:910; 11:190] for Northwest, and [ 12:801; 10:324] for United). In general, the results in Column 1 of Table 6 do not provide any support for the hypothesis that larger airlines are more aggressive than low cost airlines. Instead, low cost airlines are the most aggressive in the market, since it is much less likely that other …rms enter when they are present.
Next, market presence, the measure of heterogeneity, has a strong positive sign and is included in [11:422; 13:233] . The higher the percentage of markets that one airline serves out of an airport, the more likely it is that a …rm enters into a market. This is consistent with previous work (Berry [1992] and Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] ).
The distance from the hub of an airline (our measure of …xed costs) is negatively associated with entry ([ 2:408; 0:868]), which we expected. Both of these results are robust across the three Columns in Table 6 .
The remaining rows of Column 1 in Table 6 present the results for the control variables. The e¤ect of market distance is included in [0:772; 1:362], which implies that entry is more likely when the distance between cities is larger. The e¤ect of market size is included in [1:711; 2:407], which implies that larger markets are more likely to be served. Markets whose endpoint cities are seeing their incomes increasing are more likely to be served ([0:646; 1:469] ). Markets between cities that have multiple airports are less likely to be served, ceteris paribus. This does not imply, of course, that cities with multiple airports are less likely to be served; it just says that airlines are not likely to serve two markets out of the same city. These four results are robust across the three speci…cations. Then, there are two results concerning the distance from the geographical center of the US and the distance among airports of a city. Neither of these results is robust to changes in the speci…cations, and it is thus di¢cult to draw a clear interpretation.
We calculate the goodness of …t by taking the percentage of realized observations that were correctly predicted by the model. For example, in the simultaneous game, if the realized observation is one of the multiple equilibria predicted by the model, that particular observation is counted as correctly predicted. We correctly predict 37% of the outcomes in the simultaneous game. Column 2 of Table 6 presents the results of the estimation of the game where …rms can play sequentially. Recall that this is the framework where the type of game that …rms play depends on the exogenous history of the game. If there is a single incumbent, then the …rms play a sequential move game. Otherwise, the …rms play a simultaneous move game. The estimation results in Column 2 are quite similar to those presented in Column 1 of Table 6 . The only relevant di¤erence is in the magnitude of the strategic e¤ects for the larger …rms, but the di¤erences are not statistically signi…cant as the intervals overlap. Similarly to the simultaneous game, we calculate the goodness of …t by calculating the percentage of realized observations that are correctly predicted by the sequential game model. Using the estimated parameters, we predict when incumbents would move …rst, thereby restricting the equilibria to those in which the incumbent serves the market. When the realized equilibrium is one of our predicted equilibrium, we consider that observation as being correctly predicted. In the sequential move game, we do slightly worse in our predictions, though the di¤erence is not signi…cant.
Column 3 of Table 6 presents the results when …rms can make deterrence investments. This is the …rst set of the central results of the paper. The results are very rich and we go over them in two steps. First, we discuss how the "competitive e¤ects," , di¤er in Column 3 from Columns 1 and 2. Then, we discuss the estimation results for the cost of the deterrence investments, c.
First, we observe that the competitive e¤ects are, in some cases, larger in magnitude in Column 3 than they were in Columns 1 and 2. For example, we …nd that the e¤ect of American on its competitors is now in [ 13:722; 11:155] while before it was in [ 11:589; 9:597] . Thus, it is larger (in absolute value) and statistically di¤erent. We …nd similar results for Continental and Delta. Remarkably, we …nd the opposite for the low cost carriers, as now their e¤ect on competitors is in [ 15:590; 12:490] while in Column 1 it was in [ 18:954; 16:335] . The results for MA, Northwest, and United are similar across the three columns. These are interesting results and indicate that allowing for deterrence investments can lead to di¤erent estimates of the competitive e¤ects than when we do not allow for …rms to deter. Now, consider the estimates of the costs of deterrence. These costs are crucial for our analysis, because the higher they are, the less likely it is that a …rm deters new entrants. We …nd that American can deter the entry of new …rms in its markets by paying deterrence costs included in [ 7:458; 3:441] . These costs are lower than the competitive e¤ects of any of American's rivals (the lowest is Northwest, which is included in [ 12:989; 10:561] ). This implies that American would de…nitively pay the deterrence cost if it had the option to do so. The analysis is the same for all the other …rms except for United, whose costs of deterrence overlap the competitive e¤ects of American, Continental (though by little), LCCs, MA, and Northwest. This implies that United would only make deterrence investments if facing the potential competition of Delta. We will return to this …nding below.
Overall, these results are striking and indicate that all …rms have an incentive to make deterrence investments, though they face di¤erent costs of doing so.
To determine the …t of the model to the data, we estimate the model under the deterrence parameters and predict when …rms would deter entrants. When …rms deter, we predict only one equilibrium (the incumbent remains in the market as a monopolist). When the incumbent does not deter, the …rm still has a …rst-mover advantage and the …rms play a sequential game. Under these assumptions, we correctly predict almost half of the observed outcomes. Since the deterrence game restricts many market predictions to a single equilibrium (incumbents deter the majority of the time) instead of allowing for multiple equilibria as in the simultaneous and sequential games, the increased goodness of …t provides strong evidence that …rms are, in fact, using deterrence investments.
Comparing Pro…ts Across Types of Games
The results in this section compare the pro…ts made in the simultaneous game, the sequential game and the deterrence game for the incumbent …rm only. Because we can only identify the pro…ts up to a scale, we use the ratios of pro…ts in the di¤erent games to gauge the economic importance of being a …rst mover in the context of sequentialmove and deterrence games. There are two ways we could compute the pro…ts for comparison purposes. For example, suppose we would like to compare the deterrence pro…ts to the sequential game pro…ts. One way to do this is to calculate the deterrence pro…ts under the parameters estimated in the deterrence scenario (Column 3 of Table 6 ) and compare these pro…ts to the sequential game pro…ts calculated using those same deterrence parameters. The second way to compare these two pro…ts is to compare the deterrence pro…ts under the deterrence scenario to the sequential pro…ts using the parameters in the sequential-move game (Column 2 of Table 6 ). In the …rst case, which would be what is done in typical counterfactual analysis, we would be assuming that the …rms actually do play a deterrence game. Instead, we use the second approach because we are comparing across a menu of games that …rms can be playing. Thus, we compare the pro…ts that we would predict under the estimates in Columns 1-3 in Table 6 . In the remaning analysis we use the parameter values where the distance function is minimized and simulate 1000 errors and compute the pro…ts. The ratios of these pro…ts are reported in Tables 8, 9 and 10.
We begin with the simultaneous-move game and we use the parameters in Col- Table 6 . We …rst check if there is a unique equilibrium because in that case we have one pro…t for each …rm in the equilibrium. If there are multiple equilibria, then for each incumbent …rm we consider three possibilities: i) the highest pro…t that the …rm makes among all the possible equilibria; ii) the lowest pro…t, which can be zero if the …rm is not in the unique equilibrium or if the …rms is not in at least one of the multiple equilibria; iii) and the case where the equilibrium is selected randomly, with equal probabilities across equilibria. Table 7 shows the percentage of the time each …rm enters the market in the simultaneous game under these three possibilites. Consider Column 1 of Table 7 .
For example, the number 0.890 in the …rst column and …rst row means that American is present at most 89 percent of the times in either the unique or one of the multiple equilibria of a game that corresponds to one simulation. The number 0:038 in the second column and …rst row means that American is predicted to be present at least 3.8 percent of the time. Finally, the number 0.338 in the third column and …rst row means that American is present 33:8 percent of the times when we choose among the multiple equilibria in a random fashion, and includes the cases where American is present in the unique equilibrium of the game.
For sequential-move equilibria without deterrence investments, equilibrium pro…ts are calculated using the parameters estimated in Column 2 of Table 6 . As discussed above the incumbent moves …rst but we do not allow for the incumbent to choose the speci…c resulting equilibrium. For example, suppose American is the incumbent.
If there are multiple duopoly equilibria, American can choose to be one of the …rms in the market, but it cannot choose its competitor. Therefore, we report bounds on the sequential pro…t, where the lower bound is the minimum pro…t the incumbent could make in the sequential game and the upper bound is the maximum pro…t the incumbent could make in the sequential game. The reported sequential pro…t is the average pro…t for the incumbent …rm.
For equilibria in the game with deterrence investments we use the parameter estimates in Column 3 of Table 6 . As before we simulate the games 1000 times and take the average pro…t that each …rm makes when it chooses to deter. Tables 8 reports the ratio of sequential pro…ts to simultaneous pro…ts. The simultaneous equilibrium pro…t is calculated using three di¤erent methods, as explained above. The sequential pro…t is calculated using both the minimum and maximum sequential pro…t, which provides bounds on the ratio of the sequential to simultaneous pro…ts. The …rst column in Table 8 reports the ratio of sequential pro…ts to simultaneous pro…ts, where the simultaneous equilibrium is chosen as the best possible equilibrium for the incumbent …rm. In Column 1 we show the ratio of pro…ts in the sequential game to the highest (best case) pro…ts in the simultaneous game. The values have a range that falls below 1 for most …rms, which implies that …rms, on average, do better when they are able to choose the best possible equilibrium in the simultaneous game (the "best case") compared to when they are playing a sequential game and have a …rst-mover advantage but cannot choose a particular equilibrium.
The second columns in Tables 7 and 8 re ‡ect the "worst case" simultaneous pro…ts, where each simultaneous equilibrium is chosen as the lowest pro…t for the …rm. MA is never able to enter the market in the worst case scenario, so the lower bound of simultaneous pro…ts is zero for this …rm. For the low cost …rm, the ratio of sequential to lower-bound simultaneous pro…ts is very high; this is due to the fact that the low cost …rm can enter the market only very rarely in the worst-case scenario.
The third column in Table 8 reports the ratio of sequential pro…ts to simultane-ous pro…ts when the simultaneous equilibrium is chosen at random from all possible equilibria; the corresponding column in Table 7 reports the percentage of times the incumbent enters in the market in equilibrium. The range of the ratio of pro…ts and the percentage of entry both fall between the best case and worst case scenarios. This is because the simultaneous equilibrium is chosen at random. This means that relative to the best case, each …rm will enter less, on average, and make lower pro…ts in the simultaneous game; relative to the worst case, each …rm will enter more, on average, and make more pro…ts in the simultaneous game.
The three ratios of pro…ts provide bounds on the ratio of pro…ts made in the sequential game to those made in the simultaneous game. The randomized simultaneous pro…ts provide perhaps the most informative ratio in the sense that the randomized pro…ts re ‡ect the average pro…ts a …rm would make in the simultaneous game, if the simultaneous game were played many times. For example, American makes, on average, somewhere between 0:441 and 2:896 times as much pro…t when it plays a sequential game versus a simultaneous game where the simultaneous equilibrium is truly chosen randomly. Table 9 reports the ratio of deterrence pro…ts to simultaneous pro…ts, where the deterrence pro…t is calculated in two di¤erent ways. A …rm either compares the pro…t when it deters to its maximum possible pro…t in the sequential game (columns 1 and 2), or it compares the deterrence pro…t to its minimum possible pro…t in the sequential game (Columns 3 and 4). In the …rst column, we compare the deterrence pro…t to the maximum sequential pro…t. In the third column, we compare the deterrence pro…t to the minimum sequential pro…t.
When American decides to deter based on its maximum possible pro…t in the sequential game, it makes 1:677 times as much pro…t in the deterrence game compared to its best pro…t in the sequential game and deters 92:0 percent of the time when it is an incumbent. The remainder of the time, the …rm plays the sequential game. When comparing its deterrence pro…t to the minimum possible sequential pro…t, American makes, on average, 11:001 times more pro…t when it chooses to deter. It still enters the market 92:0 percent of the time. For all …rms except United, the decision to deter does not change when comparing the minimum to maximum sequential pro…ts.
This implies that the pro…ts in the sequential game are generally much lower than when …rms choose to deter. The exception is United. United deters much more when comparing the deterrence pro…t to the minimum sequential pro…t versus the maximum sequential pro…t. This could be due to the fact that United faces the highest cost of deterrence, and so would be more sensitive to the relative bene…t of deterrence.
It could also be the case that the range of pro…ts United makes in the simultaneous game is greater than for the other airlines. Table 10 reports the ratio of deterrence pro…ts to simultaneous pro…ts, where the simultaneous pro…ts are calculated using the three methods described above. Even when using the best possible scenario in the simultaneous game, column 1 shows that …rms are, on average, better o¤ when playing the deterrence game. This bene…t grows when the simultaneous equilibrium is chosen randomly and grows even more when the simultaneous pro…t is calculated using the worst possible equilibrium for the …rm.
In the simultaneous game, MA face a lower bound of zero pro…ts and are never in the market.
Overall, the pro…ts that incumbents can make in the sequential game, both with and without deterrence investments, are larger than those that they can make in the simultaneous move game. Further, on average it is pro…table for all …rms to deter new entrants, with the exception of United Airlines.
Conclusions
We use a practical approach of estimation to determine whether …rms make investments to raise barriers to deter new entrants. The objective of the estimation is to quantify the cost of "deterrence investments" (Bernheim [1984] ) and relate them to the monopoly pro…ts that …rms make when they successfully deter new entrants and the pro…ts that they would make as accommodating oligopolists. We model …rms as playing di¤erent types of games depending on the exogenous history of the game in each market. We …nd that the data are consistent with a model where …rms make deterrence investments. Also, we …nd that the pro…ts incumbents can make if they move …rst are larger than those that they can make if the game is played simultaneously. This result is stronger, as one would expect, when incumbents can deter new entrants. Finally, we …nd that all …rms deter new entrants, with the exception of United Airlines.
There are several limitations to our work which we leave for future research. First, and most obviously, we …nd that …rms make deterrence investments, but we do not characterize the nature of those investments. This avenue of research is clearly important for policy interventions. Second, we consider a repeated static game where the history of the game in each period is exogenous. However, …rms are likely forwardlooking when they make their investment decisions. This avenue of research is important to exactly quantify the cost of deterrence. However, the bene…t of deterrence should be even higher if we allow for its bene…t to extend over time, because …rms would be able to maintain their position as incumbents longer. Therefore, we can still think of our estimates as providing a measure for what would be the best case scenario for airlines that wanted to make the case that they do not deter new entrants.
Since we do …nd evidence of strategic deterrence even in a repeated static game, we
